

# The death of Gareth Myatt

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Published by Youth Rights UK  
Web site: <http://www.youth-rights-uk.org>

# The death of Gareth Myatt

## Background

On 19 April 2004 a 15 year old boy, Gareth Myatt, died while being restrained by guards at Rainsbrook Secure Training Centre where he was imprisoned.

He was 3 days into a 12 month sentence for assault and theft.

None of the officers involved were suspended from work by their employer after this event and subsequently the Crown Prosecution Service stated that there was not enough evidence for a prosecution.

An inquest into the death is currently adjourned.

Rainsbrook Secure Training Centre (STC) is one of 4 such centres. All are privately run by profit-making businesses. The first, known in the popular press as a 'child jail' opened in Medway in Kent in 1998. Initially these institutions were planned specifically to house 12-14 year olds under the control of the prison service as a 'stricter' alternative to local authority secure accommodation with children committed under a 'Secure Training Order'. The initial idea was one of Michael Howard's Home Secretary. It could be seen as a populist measure in response to public concerns that young offenders under 15 could not be jailed (except for the most serious crimes which would attract long jail sentences if committed by an adult). However STCs are now used to imprison 12-17 year olds.

Under New Labour a 'Detention and Training Order' (DTO) is the main instrument used against young offenders. DTOs have replaced Secure Training Orders. These sentences include a custodial component and a 'training' component.

Rainsbrook STC is run by Rebound, a part of global facilities management company GSL. Rainsbrook has capacity for 67 inmates. Rebound also runs Medway in Kent.

On the last day of March 2007 there were 238 young people held in STCs, 138 boys and 100 young women. Most were aged 15 or 16. <sup>1</sup> The maximum capacity of all 4 STCs is 274.

## What happened?

While details of facts are disputed with guard's statements contradicting each other and in at least one case themselves (from an earlier to a later statement) the main outline of what happened was this:

Gareth was asked/told to clean a sandwich toaster. A row developed. He told a guard, Mr Beadnall to fuck off. He was ordered to go to his room. He went compliantly. Mr Beadnall entered the room shortly afterwards and began to remove items from Gareth's room. This included a piece of paper with Gareth's mother's telephone number on it. At this point Gareth lashed out. According to Mr Beadnall this was a strike against his person. He then instituted a restraint technique. Two other officers and Mr Beadnall applied the technique known as a double-seated embrace. This involves two officers seated either side of the prisoner restraining him or her by holding the arm on the far side and leaning his head forwards while a third monitors the face.

The exact details of how the restraint was applied are not clear because the officer's evidence is contradictory. Mr Beadnall stated to the Inquest that Gareth would only have been held in a leaning forwards position right at the start of the hold to 'get the hold on', which is consistent with the training. However; Mr Etienne Reynolds, a duty manager on the site, reported that when he was summoned to the room when the situation had become a crisis at this point i.e. long after the start of the hold, he found the now unconscious Gareth being held in the forwards position by guards David Bailey and Diane Smith.

While in this restraint, Gareth told then officers "I can't breath". One of the officers told him "If you can talk (or shout) you can breathe". Gareth then said "I'm going to defecate". And he did. He was also sick. He then became unconscious. According to the version of events cited above even after all these things had happened the two officers either side of him continued to maintain the hold and it was only a when the duty manager arrived that they stopped and began to attend to the situation as the medical emergency it had become.

A number of issues arise out of this; was the initial instruction to Gareth fair and reasonable; was it necessary to remove items from Gareth's room in particular his mother's phone number; was the restraint necessary; was the restraint if it was necessary inherently safe or dangerous; whichever is the case was it administered (having got that far) in a responsible manner or an irresponsible and violent manner?

These in turn perhaps raise wider questions such as the quality and motivation of the staff working in these institutions, the level and type of training they receive, the possible problems of delivering custodial sentences in the commercial environment and the wider question of imprisoning children at all.

Was the initial instruction to Gareth fair and reasonable?

Item 31 (2) of the Secure Training Centre Rules <sup>2</sup> states that:

"In the control of trainees, officers shall seek to influence them through their own example and leadership, and to enlist their willing co-operation."

Whether or not it was reasonable for the officer Beadnall to request that Gareth clean the sandwich toaster is difficult to ascertain at a distance. If Gareth had used it then it would not have been unreasonable; If however the dirt he was being asked to remove had resulted from use of the equipment by other inmates prior to his arrival at the centre then it would have been unreasonable. The present writer does not have the details of this incident.

Evidence was given to the Inquest in written form by another boy that after Gareth told Mr Beadnall to fuck off the officer imitated this saying "fuck off" so as to belittle Gareth. The evidence from this boy is that this was something that Mr Beadnall often did. During the examination of Mr Beadnall by Dexter Dias representing Gareth's mother it emerged that in a police statement Mr Beadnall had expressed surprise that inmates in these institutions are given PlayStations when, as he said, some members of his family could not afford them. A possible picture was painted by Dexter Dias of a resentful Mr Beadnall who might pick on young people.

Whatever the exact circumstances surrounding the initial incident it is clear that Mr Beadnall had failed to enlist Gareth's willing co-operation.

After this argument Gareth went voluntarily to his room.

Was it necessary to remove items from Gareth's room in particular his mother's phone number?

Gareth had gone voluntarily to his room and was not damaging it. In his evidence to the Inquest Mr Beadnall explained that removing items from an inmates room was the policy. We wrote to John Bates Director of Corporate Communications for Rebound requesting a copy of this policy but have not received an answer.

Whatever the exact terms of the policy and leaving aside the question of whether it was necessary to clear Gareth's room in this case, a glaring question emerges surrounding the piece of paper with Gareth's mother's number on it. If the rationale about removing items from a room is to prevent the inmate smashing up the cell or using some piece of furniture as a weapon it is hard to see how a piece of paper could have been seen as a problem. It seems possible that this action could be explained by a certain kind of vindictiveness. Surely any adult (whether or not they had had training in dealing with young people) would recognize that for a child locked up away from home his mother's phone number was likely to be something he could not bear to have taken away? In effect removing his furniture and his mother's phone number while confining Gareth to his room would be committing him to the isolation of solitary confinement, tearing away his one link with the outside world.

The escalation of the situation to this point does not appear to have been driven by Gareth's actions. He went compliantly to his room when ordered to. At the very least questions have to be asked about the motivation, values and training of the guards, and atmosphere at the detention centre, if an instruction to a child to clean a sandwich toaster so readily escalated to a physical restraint incident. As we shall see there is evidence that in STCs guards frequently use restraint to ensure compliance, against the regulations.

It cannot possibly have been necessary to remove from Gareth's possession a piece of paper with his mother's telephone number on. There can be no Health and Safety reason for doing this and it cannot have been required by any policy; it can only have been done out of punitive vindictiveness or incredible insensitivity. It was this act which sparked Gareth, understandably, to lash out.

## Was the restraint necessary?

Mr Beadnall gave evidence to the inquest that Gareth had hit him and that this prompted the restraint.

Gareth was just 4ft 10in (1.25m) tall and weighed six and a half stone (41kg). Mr Beadnall weighed at the time, around 16 stone.

Even if Gareth had hit Mr Beadnall rather than simply lashing out when the phone number was taken it seems unlikely that Mr Beadnall was actually under any physical threat from Gareth. Mr Beadnall could simply have de-escalated the situation by returning the piece of paper with the phone number on it; this would not have prevented him carrying out the exercise of removing other items from the room. That he choose instead to instigate a restraint incident suggests a willingness to use restraint too readily.

Mr Beadnall himself had one of the highest number of restraint incidents to his name amongst staff at the centre. He had been specifically monitored for excessive use of pain-compliance during restraints in a period prior to this event.

In an internal Rainsbrook training document staff on a training course for restraint methods were given nicknames such as 'Clubber Clay' , 'crusher', 'mauler' etc. While this may have been ironic it does suggest at least an attitude of irresponsibility towards using restraint and a lack of care.

Lord Carlile's inquiry into use of restraint, solitary confinement and forcible strip-searching of children commissioned by the Howard League <sup>3</sup> found that:

"The Inquiry received evidence that restraint was used by staff simply to secure compliance. Both staff and children reported that disobedience or refusal to comply with an instruction could result in physical restraint. This was particularly an allegation made about regimes in the secure training centres". (Item 137).

The report also raised the possibility that a minority of staff deliberately provoked an inmate so that they could use restraint for personal gratification. (Item 133).

John Parker, the Director of Rainsbrook, told the Inquest that restraint was only used as a last resort.

In this particular case that is simply not an arguable proposition.

The ex-Youth Justice Board (YJB) chairman Professor Rod Morgan is reported by the BBC as saying in February 2006 : "We want to move to a situation where the staff have sufficient confidence and are sufficiently well-trained that they don't have to rely on physical restraint to the degree that in some instances they are currently doing," <sup>4</sup> This is an astonishing admission that staff are so lacking in suitable skills to relate to and manage young people that they have to use physical force where it is not necessary.

Lord Carlile's report found that "Staff development in some establishments currently focuses on physical management of aggression and violence rather than developing skills to avert conflict". (Item 61).

If the approach in training was geared towards building relationships with young people

rather than the physical control of them then there would be less need to use restraint.

## Was the restraint technique used inherently dangerous?

Following Gareth's death the Youth Justice Board (YJB) commissioned a report into restraint by a police expert in restraint, Mr Boatman, and a medical expert Mr Bleetman. Their report found that there was a pattern of danger in the use of this technique in the year before Gareth's death. Specifically out of 52 cases examined 34 were found "where the lives of children were unacceptably endangered".

The technique used - the double-seated embrace - was subsequently withdrawn from use by the Youth Justice Board.

The police found that this technique tended to be used as the default restraint technique at Rainsbrook and described this as "worrying".

The technique involves two members of staff seated on a bed either side of the child, interlocking their arms around his or her body and pinning the arms, then leaning the body forwards. A third member of staff is supposed to monitor the safety of the hold by looking into the victim's face and monitoring for signs of distress.

Mr Boatman explained to the Inquest what might seem self-evident to some; that this hold places pressure on the diaphragm and could lead to breathing difficulties ("positional asphyxia"). The inquest heard of previous cases of this technique being used at Rainsbrook and young people reporting they could not breath. A young girl gave evidence to Carlile that she could not breath while being restrained and was told "if you can't breath, why are you speaking". (Item 138).

The current climate of child protection in the UK urges adults to believe what children say. It seems that when these children in custody complain that they can't breath they are ignored. The Howard League won a judicial review in 2002 that obliged the government to recognise that the Children Act 1989 applied to young people in prisons. It seems that there is nonetheless a culture in the treatment of young people in penal custody that does not take an approach based on protection of children from harm.

A duty manager at Rainsbrook on the night Gareth died, Etienne Reynolds, explained to the Inquest why the staff restraining Gareth took no action when he said he couldn't breath; he suggested that Gareth may have been lying. He then suggested that Gareth may have been faking it when he slumped forwards unconscious. Dexter Dias for Gareth's mother asked Mr Reynolds if this was typical of the attitude of staff towards young people at Rainsbrook. Clearly it seems a very long way from the Every Child Matters agenda which, on their web site, GSL promises us informs their work at Rainsbrook.

Carilile reported (Item 143) that child protection policies in the 'secure estate' for young children "ignore the question of whether treatment in custody could be interpreted as abusive" and called this "a major structural weakness".

The Youth Justice Board had been asked by the Home Office to review the safety of PCC (Physical Control in Care) in 1998 and had not done so. This emerged at the Inquest during examination of Mark Perfect who had been chief executive of the YJB at the time of Gareth's death.

The technique used on Gareth was inherently dangerous according to the experts employed after the event to review it by the Youth Justice Board. it would seem that its use



in this case was made more lethal by the fact that the staff applying it did not heed Gareth's multiple signals of distress; saying he could not breathe, defecating and being sick. We should also remember that Gareth was a slightly built child weighing less than 7 stone.

Mr Beadnall who as the third member of the restraint team was supposed to be monitoring Gareth was seen on the centre's CCTV continuing to remove items from Gareth's room while the child was, according to Mr Etienne Reynold's first police statement, still being held in a dangerous forwards leaning position by the other two officers and had according to one of the other officers involved, David Bailey, already been sick.

At the Inquest the prison officer responsible for training STC staff in the use of this restraint technique was criticised by the lawyer for the 3 prison officers because the training manual he had produced lacked clear information about the dangers of this technique. The lawyer for the Home Office was keen in her questioning of Mr Beadnall to clarify that they had 'spoken' to Gareth during the restraint in line with the policy. A slightly unreal line to take given that the conversation had been "I can't breathe", to which the response was "if you can talk you can breathe".

As the prison officer responsible for the training, who fully accepted the short-comings in the training manual, said, it should be obvious to anyone that if a child says they cannot breathe and is showing other signs of distress there is a problem. You should not need a manual to tell you that if a child being held in a restraint says "I can't breathe" and a few moments later "I'm going to defecate" and does something is seriously wrong.

On the question of training in the use of restraint; the training in restraint provided to staff at Rainsbrook by the prison service appears to have relied on a certain amount of good sense on the part of staff. This essentially was the defence of the prison service trainer Mr Hardy to the charges by Mr Boatman that the PCC training manual was inadequate. It is possible that there was a mis-match of cultures here; the training would have been adequate for prison officers but was inadequate for the different context of the STCs. If this explanation carries weight the responsibility lies with the YJB for not ensuring that the staff in the STCs were more thoroughly trained in the use of restraint in a style appropriate for them bearing in mind that they are dealing with children as young as 12 and more vulnerable older teenagers rather than 15 and upwards in the prison service. The implication would be that rather than use the prison service to deliver the training in the use of restraint a specialist training package should have been commissioned which was designed specifically for STC staff.

Ultimately though it was not the technique that killed Gareth. Nor did Gareth kill himself. Gareth exhibited multiple signs of distress. The individuals carrying out the restraint did not heed these warning signs.

All 3 staff involved had received First Aid training. It begs the question why they did not apply it before the arrival on the scene of the duty manager and indeed according to one version of events were still applying the hold to the unconscious body of Gareth.

## The motivation, backgrounds and training of the staff working in Secure Training Centres

Dexter Dias established that David Beadnall had no professional child care experience prior to being employed at Rainsbrook. His previous employment was in a leisure centre.

When New Labour's Jack Straw continued with the plan to bring in Secure Training Centres which had been started by Michael Howard he told the BBC that the emphasis would be on rehabilitation. The BBC reported that they were informed that "most staff would come from a childcare background" .<sup>5</sup>

It seems this was not the case with David Beadnall.

David Beadnall's training for his new role took just seven weeks.

This is in many ways at the heart of what happened. How did an instruction to clean a sandwich toaster lead to a child's death?

Whatever Mr Beadnall's personal failings his actions and those of his colleagues took place in a culture which they found rather than made.

The culture in Secure Training Centres as described by Carlile, and we have already touched on, is one which demands compliance and obedience from children. One girl interviewed for the Carlile report said that to get a PCC (restraint) all you need to do is slam a mug onto a table. (Item 138).

The Howard League report gives figures for the number of restraints at Rainsbrook between September 1999 and May 2004; 3,096. This is 54 per month. Rainsbrook has a capacity for 67 inmates. In any one month then, assuming full capacity, a child would have had an 80% chance of being restrained. A child on a 12 month sentence might have expected to be restrained 9 or 10 times during their sentence. If capacity was less than full the chances of being restrained per individual would be higher. It would seem likely that some children are more repeatedly restrained than others. The restraint which led to Gareth's death was his second in three days.

As we have seen Mr Morgan, the now ex-chariman of the YJB stated to the BBC in 2006 that he would like to move to a situation where "staff have sufficient confidence and are sufficiently well-trained that they don't have to rely on physical restraint to the degree that in some instances they are currently doing". But the Statutory Rules for STCs state that "In the control of trainees, officers shall seek to influence them through their own example and leadership, and to enlist their willing co-operation". These were laid down in 1998. In 2006 Mr Morgan was talking about 'moving towards' a situation which according to the regulations laid down in 1998 should have been the norm.

As we have seen Mark Perfect the chief executive of the YJB at the time of Gareth's death accepted that the YJB had not instituted a review of the restraint techniques though this was something which the Home office had asked it to do in 1998.

The director of Rainsbrook John Parker blithely told the Inquest that restraint was only used as a last resort. He also told the Inquest he had not read the manual on PCC - the method of restraint of children in use at his institution nearly twice a day.

In the light of this apathy from the leadership about the management of children in their

care Mr Beadnall's actions and those of his colleagues become more understandable.

Managing wayward children is difficult. The challenge is as Mr Morgan identifies to do this without violence.

Ordering children about and using physical pressure when they resist is a hang-over from the past. Yet this appears to be to some extent the culture in Secure Training Centres.

On the evidence put before the Inquest it seems hard to see how the particular restraint which led to Gareth Myatt's death was really required; he went to his room voluntarily; he was a diminutive figure compared to the officer he is supposed to have struck; he only lashed out when his mother's phone number was taken from the room; there can have been no real reason to remove this from the boy's room; simply giving this back would probably have de-escalated the situation.

To be able to build a relationship with a young person - so that, for example when you make a reasonable request of him or her she or he complies - is difficult, more so with some young people than others. It takes both a personal motivation to want to do that and probably (especially where the motivation is not so strong) some training. Training in Youth and Community Work can take 2 years full-time study - for a diploma, for example, longer for a full degree. Seven weeks training with subsequent inset days is unlikely to be enough; Mr Beadnall and his colleagues may have a genuine desire to work with young people but, if that is so, they should be supported with a serious training. Seven weeks training sounds not so much like a training to deliver the "childcare best practice" GSL promises us on their web site as just sufficient training to prepare people for the role of prison guard.

The YJB has a responsibility to see that people employed to supervise and care for young people in the Secure Estate are interested in the agenda of care and rehabilitation of offenders and are sufficiently trained.

One part of the problem may be that for political reasons all the Secure Training Centres (and 2 Young Offender's Institutions) are run by private profit-making companies.

## Delivering custodial sentences for children for a profit

Rainsbrook, where Gareth died, is run by Rebound ECD. Rebound is a subsidiary of GSL, a global business with interests in prisons, immigration services, court services, facilities management in healthcare and education and other areas. Rebound also runs Medway in Kent.

Hassockfield in County Durham is run by Serco. Serco is also an international facilities management company. Serco also runs Ashfield YOI in Gloucestershire.

Oakhill near Milton Keynes is run by Group 4 Securicor. Group 4 Securicor is another international business, specialising in security. G4S also runs Parc YOI and HMP in Bridgend in Wales.

Is there any problem with contracting out the delivery of punishment and rehabilitation to the private sector?

At the Inquest Peter Boatman, the expert who had written a report for the YJB into restraint techniques, stated categorically that in his view the 3 companies operating the STCs did not fully share information about problems with restraint techniques in their respective centres and this was due to competitive commercial pressures. The lawyer for the Home Office and YJB pointed out that there was a mechanism in place for information to be shared. Mr Boatman replied that the existence of a mechanism did not mean that information was shared and re-iterated his position.

When a child (or indeed adult, though our focus is on children), is sentenced by the courts to a custodial sentence this is a punishment by the state on behalf of society. If the delivery of the sentence is handed-off to a private company it is that private company and no longer the state who takes responsibility for delivering the sentence.

I would suggest there is a difference between being punished for profit and punished by the state. In the latter case the people delivering the sentence are public employees who, presumably, believe in what they are doing - that is they may have some sense of public spiritness about them. When the sentence is delivered in the private sector the danger is that it is just a job.

In local authority secure accommodation staff are likely to have a commitment to social care. In a publicly run Young Offenders Institution there may well still be a sense of public sector commitment. In Rainsbrook STC a leisure centre worker is taken on, given 7 weeks training, and then expected to set a leadership example to an undoubtedly troubled young person. Mr Beadnall was surprised that young people at Rainsbrook got Play Stations. Had he come from a social care background he might not have been surprised. At the Inquest Mr Beadnall took pains to remind us that Gareth was "in" for theft and assault.

It is clear that Mr Beadnell did not see Gareth as a troubled young child who needed care. Rather, he saw him as someone to be punished.

On their web site GSL state "The policies and aims of Rebound's STCs are derived from the principles of childcare best practice and reflect the every child matters agenda".

It is very difficult indeed to reconcile "childcare best practice" with 54 restraint incidents a month at Rainsbrook and the finding by Lord Carlile that restraint was being used for

compliance in STCs.

It is questionable whether locking children up in a penal institution as opposed to local authority care could ever be described as "childcare best practice". Certainly STCs were brought in to punish children.

## Summary

Gareth Myatt died when he was put in a restraint by 3 prison guards. How did a very minor row over cleaning a sandwich toaster - of the sort that every parent must have experienced now or then - lead to the death (by asphyxia) of a 15 year old boy?

It seems clear that the following are the main contributory factors:

- i) A lack of training in working with young people on the part of Mr Beadnall which allowed a minor incident to escalate so readily to a violent one. Quite possibly a lack of understanding of troubled young people - rather; he appears to have had a punitive conception of his role. This is in marked contrast to the regime of education and rehabilitation which Jack Straw promised us when the regime of STCs was continued by New Labour.
- ii) A culture, identified by the Howard League, within STCs of using restraint excessively and to assert dominance and control rather than for the lawful purposes of preventing an inmate harming themselves or others or damaging property.
- iii) A blasé and apathetic attitude on the part of all those in the management chain who did not examine the use of restraint by front-line staff. John Parker director of Rainsbrook had not read the manual on restraint in use at his centre. The YJB had not carried out a review of PCC (Physical Care and Control!) as requested by the Home Office.
- iv) An imbecilic inability of all the staff who carried out the restraint to react to obvious warning signs that a medical emergency was taking place. The duty manager Mr Etienne Reynolds suggested to the Inquest that the explanation for this inactivity was that the staff may have thought Gareth was faking it. Again; a picture emerges of a regime which has very little to do with childcare and everything to do with not believing children and punishment - the exact opposite of the Every Child Matters agenda.

We recall that it took a judicial review instigated by the Howard League for the government to accept that the Children's Act with its outlook of protecting children should also apply to children in prison. A large percentage of young people in prison have previously been in care. Most will have experienced difficult backgrounds. If ever a place called out for the application of the Children's Act it would be an STC.

It is quite possible in hierarchically managed institutions for the front-line workers to be carrying out the implicit policy of their superiors at exactly the same time as those superiors are publicly espousing another policy. It may well be that Mr Beadnall was carrying out a populist punitive approach to young people which is exactly how STCs were envisaged in the first place by Michael Howard. Gareth was, after all, "in" for assault and theft.

That the country at large can so easily be persuaded to feel vindictive towards troubled young people, lawbreakers or not, as happens time and time again when governments whip up the law and order fervour, is disquieting.

The inception of STCs was specifically a measure by a punitive Home Secretary, Michael Howard, to put more children into prison, children who at that time would otherwise have been sent to local authority secure accommodation. New Labour continued this policy, while claiming that their vision of STCs was one based on education and rehabilitation. It

seems that, when it comes to behaviour management, it is the former vision - the punitive one - which underlies the treatment of vulnerable children and young people in STCs.

Baroness Linklater of Butterstone made the following comments in the House of Lords in March 2006:

"Lastly, the quality and length of training of staff is absolutely vital. Currently, STCs put their staff through seven weeks of training before they start, with subsequent follow-up training days. Given the challenges of the children, that is entirely inadequate. It is unprofessional, I claim, and wrong to ask staff with such brief training to manage such children. The outcome has been that the turnover rate of staff in STCs is extremely high, and it is no accident that at Oakhill, the newest STC which has made a very unhappy start and has had a poor inspection report, the first director has resigned and has been replaced by a career prison governor from Ashfield YOI, who was responsible for 360 15 to 17 year-olds. Prison staff do not have the training to work with young children. Standards of practice are inevitably very different and ultimately the risk of the improper use of restraint, single separation or strip searching grows through a combination of inexperience, lack of training and therefore confidence.

In that light, even with the good intentions which I know those who are running the STCs have, particularly with their emphasis on education, it is quite clear that the needs of this group of children cannot be appropriately met in these institutions. Eight years ago they did not exist; they are a creation of this Government. In the past, very young prolific offenders had their needs met in specialist secure children's homes, in psychiatric units or in the community. Now we are punishing, not treating; criminalising, not civilising our vulnerable young people. A comprehensive review of the whole approach is urgently needed so that these children can be better helped. Otherwise, the costs both to the Government and the country will continue to escalate. "

## **Conclusion**

STCs were conceived of as punitive measure. Despite subsequent window dressing that is what they remain. We call for the STCs to be closed down and the money re-allocated to build, if necessary, more Local Authority secure accommodation where vulnerable young people under 16 who have committed serious offences can be cared for by people with a childcare background.

## **Notes**

1. Data supplied by YJB in an email 2/4/07
2. The Secure Training Centre Rules 1998. No. 472 Statutory Instrument
3. Lord Carlile of Berriew QC. An independent inquiry into the use of physical restraint, solitary confinement and forcible strip-searching of children in prisons, secure training centres and local authority secure children's homes. The Howard League for Penal Reform. 2006. (Available from the Howard League).
4. Web site: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4722652.stm>
5. Web site: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/78083.stm>

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