The out-of-her-depth and generally inadequate Kaja Kallas apparently thinks they are winning;
Russia is on the back foot, militarily, economically, but also diplomatically, but as the latest strikes on Kyiv have shown, Russia still shows no genuine interest in peace, which was also the clear view of the ministers today. [1]
The line about Russia “shows no interest in peace” means, (when you decode it), that Russia is not yet ready to fall into line with how the EU intends to manage the “peace process”. For example, the EU plan is for a ceasefire followed by negotiations. Russia’s plan is for negotiations to take place in parallel. What Kallas really means is that “Russia has no interest in our peace process”. And, so, the basic atttitude which led up to this war, prevails. The core idea is that the EU dictates and Russia obeys. But, that is not the way to conduct negotiations with another country, either in peace or in wartime.
And, still, no plan for how they will win. She is gloating that Russia is under pressure, which they are, but offers no plan for ‘victory’, which means all she proposes is more of the same. Apparently they are simply hoping that eventually Russia will collapse and give in. But, as this site repeatedly points out, if Russia feels itself under decisive pressure it is more likely to escalate, not collapse.
Kallas also repeats that there will be no legal recognition of the occupied Ukrainian territory, which promises us an eternity of a frozen conflict.
Let’s look at some economic figures:
GDP of EU: approximately 20 trillion dollars. [2]
GDP of US: 29 trillion USD [3]
BRICS+: 32 trillion USD
It looks like Russia has plenty of scope for trade. True; they have lost part, (not all!), of their market for easy money by piping gas to Europe, (partly offseet by increased EU purchases of LNG), [4] Russia’s path to development will be slower as a result of their restricted access to Western capital and tech, but the headline figure, suggests that they will not be knocked out.
The situation is summed up by this report from a French academic academy, (sometime in 2025):
Following Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western countries imposed unprecedented economic sanctions. Yet there is limited evidence that these measures have inflicted substantial economic pain on Russia, as the recent slowdown has largely reflected factors unrelated to sanctions. Russia’s resilience stems not only from its economic size but also from key structural factors: loopholes in the sanctions regime that preserve residual ties with the West, a military-driven fiscal stimulus boosting domestic demand, and the refusal of China and much of the Global South to join Western sanctions.
These countries have become major trade intermediaries and benefited from the exit of Western firms. The modest effectiveness of sanctions raises questions about their continuation. As sanctions multiply and economic ties with the EU weaken, Europe’s
political leverage over Russia diminishes further—exacerbated by ambivalent U.S. policies under Donald Trump and the prospect of renewed U.S.–Russia economic cooperation. Together, these developments point to the need for a reassessment of EU sanctions policy, with greater reliance on incentives rather than punitive measures.). [5]
It may give Kallas’s spleen some input to think that Russia is under economic pressure, but, it just seems that the sanctions policy is not going to do it. What then? And, the truth is, no plan. Just continue; more weapons, more Ukrainian dead, and hoping against hope that somehow Russia will collapse.
I don’t like making predictions, but I can see the following scenarios: 1) Escalation. Russia strikes a European country, perhaps one from which Ukraine has managed to launch a drone, and then it is anybody’s guess. 2) Ukraine collapses – they simply run out of men. 3) the EU finally manage to see enough sense to permit themselves to negotiate a frozen conflict. One of the problems here is the Ukrainian war is now tied up with the projects to militarise the EU and “European re-armament”. That creates a juggernaught which is hard to stop. But, maybe they will realize they can still do this without a bloodbath in Ukraine.
I don’t know, but all the signs are bad. Even as we see occasional indications that Europe recognises that it is time to talk, they always follow up with reiterating their maximalist demands.
When a general fights a war, I imagine, he has a plan, a clear idea of what victory looks like and a strategic plan to achieve it. The EU doesn’t even really have a clear idea of what victory looks like for them, perhaps Russia leaves Ukraine and “Ukraine’s soverign right to choose” is restored. But, no coherent strategy to get there at all. It is some kind of bureacrats’ war. Issue edicts from Brussels, institute a few policies, subcontract the fighting, and all problems will be solved. But, it seems, they won’t be. Russia remains, “resurgent Russia”, if you like, and the EU still shows no sign they have the political maturity to figure out how to deal with it.
It isn’t really spoken but at the root of the policy seems to be the idea that if you offer Russia any accomodation at all, they will “invade Europe” tomorrow. This is a misreading of history. It comes about because lightweights such as Kallas, (with her illiterate claim about Russia having attacked 19 countries in the last 100 years), [6] are in charge. (I haven’t seen the report she must have commissioned to produce this figure. One assumes it contains false claims, for example that Russia attacked Georgia in 2008 – in reality Georgia launched a surprise attack on Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia. It also seems that Russia is equated with the USSR, which is historically illiterate; that was another era, with its own ideological superpower conflict). But, fundamentally, this is stupid. Russia attacked Ukraine because a) Ukraine was being armed with Western weapons, CIA bases were being established, and the US was pressing forwards with the plans to integrate it into NATO and b) following a foreign coup in Kiev, the rights of ethnic Russians and more Russian leaning peoples in the East came under threat. These are two objective reasons of the kind that typically lead states to “attack” their neighbours; their neighbours are arming against them, and a minority conflict. Russia didn’t just up and “attack” Ukraine, (any more than they did Georgia). What happened is explainable in terms of the theories of how states work and interact. Kallas is the EUs Foreign Policy Chief, but has no idea of international politics at all. Strange.
Notes.
- https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/may/28/europe-russia-ukraine-talks-heatwave-kaja-kallas-putin-latest-news-updates?filterKeyEvents=false&page=with%3Ablock-6a1832c68f08cf8299b16a96#block-6a1832c68f08cf8299b16a96
- https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=EU
- https://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states
- https://en.highnorthnews.com/politics/eu-buys-more-arctic-russian-lng-in-march-than-any-month-on-record/1109813
- https://escp.eu/sites/default/files/inline-images/Instituts/ESCP_Geopolitics/Atelier_3/Policy_Paper_2026_01.pdf
- https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/informal-foreign-affairs-council-press-conference-high-representative-kaja-kallas_en