The New Observer International affairs Trajectory of the Ukraine-Russia war

Trajectory of the Ukraine-Russia war

I have seen a figure of at least 500,000 combined dead on both sides. Who knows if that is true. Even if half that, still a staggering figure. Not to mention the countless men who have been maimed. Our capacity to accept this much death in pursuit of political objectives gives me pause for thought.

How is this going to end? It is difficult to work out how it could end. As I understand it, the situation at the moment is something like this. The Kremlin has offered the only concession they could; they will settle for all of Dontsk and Luhansk, and those parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia that they currently occupy, surrendering their claim to the rest of Kherson and Zaporizhia. This means that Kiev would have to give to Russia the remaining part of Donetsk still under their, Kiev’s, control. I assume Russia still demands that Ukraine never join Nato. I don’t know what they need in that regard; a Treaty with the US, a line in the Ukranian constitution, or (impossible to get, I assume, given consensus decision making), a Treaty with Nato to this effect. Then, there are the other demands such as Russian langugae rights in what is left of Ukraine, and restrictions on the size of the Ukranian army. Some of these demands should be manageable. For example; I have seen a text which spoke about Ukraine rccognizing minority language rights in line with EU principles.

Kiev seems to be unwilling – and unable – to agree to surrender the remaining part of Donetsk. They seem to be seeking a ceasefire on the present lines, followed by talks. This is the strategy they used when they agreed to the Minsk accords. A ceasefire, without agreeing to anything, and then hoping, in time, to reverse the losses. One can see why the Kremlin is not going to take the bait.

Neither leadership can back down. The Russian population, (the majority), would not be able to accept that the SVO had failed – which is what it would look like if Russia did not take, at least, Luhansk and Donetsk. Putin would have to go. And, more to the point, no leader would be able to sell this loss in Russia. (There are of course people who would accept it, but they are a minority). The Ukrainian population, tired after 5 years of war, might be a little more ready for serious compromises; especially if they are offered rapid EU membership as a sweetner. (Sussh; don’t tell them that Putin has never opposed Ukraine joining the EU). But, then, there is the far-right. It was the Azov battalian who scuppered Zelenksy’s genuine attempt in 2019, after he was elected, to implement Minsk, on the basis of a referendum. I imagine that they would try to scupper this one. It seems to me that if the current regime in Kiev moved to accept the war on Russia’s terms, there could well be armed conflict within Ukraine. Thus – both leaderships have very little room for manouevre.

I don’t know enough about internal Ukrainian politics. Is there any possibility of a more pluralist party coming to power, (assuming that elections could be held), a more pragmatic party, less prone to celebrating the awkward parts of Ukrainian’s nationalist past? In fact, Ukraine had such a party – Party of the Regions, but at the request of the security services, it was banned in 2023. [1] The political climate in Kiev, with its bans on opposition parties and media, does not seem conducive to a “peace party” coming to power. And, even it that happened, what would they do about Azov, or, more to the point, what would Azov do about them?

The reality is it is hard, despite all the death and carnage, to see a political compromise. On this basis, we can look at the military and economic situations. Ukraine is taking a pounding from Russia’s attacks on infrastructure. Agriculture exports are down because of Russian attacks on Odessa. In the last few days their major steel producer has had to halt production. [2] After agricultural products steel is Ukraine’s second biggest export. Ukraine is running out of money. They need even more from the EU than the huge loan agreed last year. It isn’t clear if the EU can provide it. If they don’t, then Ukraine’s ability to run a functioning state, for example, paying state workers, will simply collapse. Let’s consider the military front. Countries don’t collapse as a result of air campaigns, (this is a key point made by John Mearsheimer); militarily, to force a country to capitulate you need a land operation. Russia is making slow progress in Donetsk. Ukraine has a well-documented manpower problem. The front-line could collapse at any time. Looking at the other side of the equation; the same argument applies. Kiev’s drone campaign on Russia is, no doubt, causing pain and discomfort. But, it won’t cause the Kremlin to throw up their hands and give up. As for the economic sanctions. There is no doubt at all that the economy is under pressure. There is a budget deficit; in 2026 already greater than expected. [3] The national reserves are falling. [4] – though, the overall value of the fund does fluctuate. But; Russia is not even in the same boat as Ukraine. Russia is a struggling economy. Ukraine is sinking fast, already on the last stages of life-support.

One final point on the military front. Ukraine is dependent on US satelite data, not just for targetting but also for fire control. If that is turned off, could the Europeans fill the gap? I am not a military expert, but somehow I doubt it. This is one more risk for Kiev.

One more risk factor for Kiev. Unlike in Russia governments can easily be changed in Europe. The so-called ‘far-right’, is gaining ground both in France and Germany. These political movements recognise that “supporting Ukraine” is not in the interests of their countries.

With all this in mind, and given the functional realities which make a political solution unlikely, it seems to me, that simply, all the weight is on the Russian side of the balance sheet. On that basis, we can predict an eventual Russian military victory of some kind on the battlefield. However; it is not that simple. There has to be somone in Kiev who can a) hold power and b) sign a surrender agreement. I am not sure who that would be. If such a party did exist, would they not face armed opposition, from the right-wing paramilitaries? I don’t think Russia has the capacity to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine, as the Allies and the USSR combined managed to fully occupy Nazi Germany at the end of WWII – and subdue any holdouts. So, what happens, if there is civil war in Kiev, and an armed party of resistance is active, and there is no stable power to sign an agreement? Russia at that point is likely to tell the West to clean up their own mess. In other words, I can see a very messy end. We could even get to the point where EU forces are deployed not to “deter Russia” but to control the paramilitaries and enforce a peace. It it not beyond the realm of imagination that the Coallition of the Willing might end up policing their own defeat. A nice humiliation – and potential proof that hubris carries a cost.

Of course, grim though it is, the above is the happy option. The alternative is that this escalates into an UK+EU-Russia war.

Notes

  1. https://web.archive.org/web/20230222072609/https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/02/21/7390318/
  2. https://gmk.center/en/news/flat-steel-exports-from-ukraine-fell-by-45-m-m-in-august/ https://efe.com/english/latest-news/2026-09-26/russian-attacks-and-blocked-exports-hamper-ukraines-metal-industry/
  3. https://www.reuters.com/business/russia-will-have-budget-deficit-not-exceeding-3-gdp-2026-finance-minister-says-2026-09-21/
  4. https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/116945/