Chapter 1 Rational Actor Assumption
Professor Mearsheimer defines rational decision making in International Relations as a state having a credible theory and as a state coming to a decision as a result of a deliberative process. Examples of credible theories include democratic peace theory and offensive realism. (Of course, Mearsheimer criticises democratic peace theory, but the point is that it is a credible theory).
Mearsheimer criticises the two main theories of rationality in International Relations; rational choice theory and political psychology. Both political psychology and rational choice refer to utility maximisation. Utility maximisation is the well-known method of making a decision by, for each option, multiplying its value by the probability that it will come true and comparing the results. However; Mearsheimer argues that this is not how decisions are actually made in International Relations. Sometimes rational choice theory says that the theory is based on the idea that actors make decisions as if they use utility maximisation; but this cannot provide an account of how decisions are actually made; there is no description of the decision making process. In some accounts of rational choice theory there is an ‘admission’ that decision makers actually use utility maximisation; but, this cannot be, because, in fact, argues Mearsheimer, there is just not enough information available in the field of foreign policy decision making to be able to use the utility maximisation model. Neither school has much to say about the second important criteria of Mearsheimer’s theory; that decisions are usually made by groups of people and that open deliberation amongst them is a necessary hallmark of rational decision making.
Both rational choice theory and political psychology claim that irrationality is widespread. Mearsheimer contends that irrationality is the exception. Mearsheimer asserts that decisions in International Relations are typically made by leaders who are using a theory of International Relations, (even if they don’t know they are using a theory), and who come to a decision as a result of a deliberative process amongst key decision makers.
Chapter 2 Strategic Rationality and Uncertainty
Rationality is about navigating the world in pursuit of desired goals. The goals themselves must be rational.
Mearsheimer emphasises that decision making in International Relations takes place in a field which is high in information uncertainty. Nonetheless rationality requires that actors order the world into comprehensible and meaningful regularities. (Mearshimer quotes Stephen Kalberg on Max Weber).
The two areas of foreign policy decision making which leaders have to attend to are developing a long-term strategy, and crisis management.
In this chapter Mearsheimer uses historical case studies to support his claim that a key factor in how states think is a lack of information. One example he uses is America needing to decide after the end of WWII what their policy should be in Europe. Should they pull out of Europe and retreat into isolationism, or pursue a policy of off-shore balancing, supporting Europe from a distance, should they contain the USSR by maintaining a presence in Europe, or should they actively seek to roll back the USSR in Eastern Europe? This decision had to be made in a context when there were multiple unknowns; how would Germany emerge from the war, what would be the policies of France, Britain and Italy, how would the USSR react to each of the 4 main choices? These, and many other factors, could not be known or predicted. The decision had to be made in an uncertain world; that is, not a world of quantifiable risk.
Chapter 3 Defining Strategic Rationality
This is quite a theoretical chapter. Mearsheimer presents his view that rational policymakers are driven by credible theories. Policymakers who employ non credible theories or no theory at all are irrational. Most policymakers on the international scene are rational. A credible theory is one which is logically consistent internally and consistent with its base assumptions and which is supported by empirical evidence. Typical assumptions might be that states are rational and that states wish to survive. Credible theories can have minor flaws in logic but should, overall, be arguable and supported by empirical evidence.
An example of causal logics is how democratic peace theory explains its belief that democracies rarely fight each other because leaders in democracies are accountable to publics who are likely to oppose war.
Theories can be credible but wrong. After the collapse of the USSR the USA pursued a policy of liberal hegemony. This was based on 3 theories. Democratic peace theory, which we have mentioned above, economic interdependence theory, the view that if two countries are economically interdependent they will be unlikely to go to war, and liberal institutionalism, the idea that nations can come together in international organisations and work out their differences peacefully. These theories are, in Mearsheimer’s view, credible. You can make a case for them, which is based on realistic assumptions, confirmation that their causal logics are plausible, and evident support by reference to empirical data. However, it is the work of the theoretician to critique other theories as she or he develops their own. Mearshsimer believes that these views are, while credible, wrong. The case for this is made in his book The Great Delusion – Liberal Dreams and International Realities. [1]
Mearsheimer describes his own theory as “offensive realism”. He critiques liberal theories, as mentioned above. He also critiques the theory of defensive realism. This theory argues that states tend to stay on the defensive and that war is usually the result of miscalculation. In Mearsheimer’s theory, states are always on the lookout for opportunities to shift the balance of power in their favor—through arms buildups, alliances, or war—with hegemony as their ultimate goal. They do this because they live in an uncertain and dangerous world with no ultimate policeman to maintain order and in this world the only safe place is to be a hegemon. Indeed the only safe position is to be world hegemon, but it is not possible to achieve this, (barring some kind of super weapon). The oceans mean that it is not possible for any one state to dominate the world. Thus the theory envisages a perpetual state of conflict between states. However, all realists believe that states are primarily interested in survival in a dangerous world, without a central authority.
Liberals see state interests as the driver. Realists, the system. Realism is a structuralist theory. Liberals believe that interests such as peace and prosperity drive events. Policy makers are either liberals or realists.
Mearsheimer discusses various non credible theories. For example; Mearsheimer criticises neoclassical realism which holds that states are primarily interested in survival but also sometimes are focussed on domestic interests. For Mearsheimer this is a contradiction. Democratic war theory holds that elites in emerging democracies are inclined to war to garner public support. For Mearsheimer this theory is non credible because it lacks empirical evidence.
Forcible democracy promotion theory posits that a state can use military force to topple a nondemocratic leader and transform the target state into a democracy. Mearsheimer argues that this theory is non credible because the empirical evidence is against it. Despite many interventions abroad based on this theory there have been virtually no successful cases.
A major analysis notes that between World War II and 2004, “the United States intervened more than 35 times in developing countries around the world. . . . In only one case—Colombia after the American decision in 1989 to engage in the war on drugs—did a full-fledged, stable democracy . . . emerge within 10 years. That’s a success rate of less than 3%.” This dismal record continues into the present, showing that forcible democracy promotion theory is noncredible.
Leaders can be crippled by over emotion, but this happens rarely and other leaders work around them. Another example of irrational thinking is arguing from analogies or “heuristics”; for example, overreliance on an initial view and being unwilling to update it.
Mearsheimer emphasises that part of making rational decisions is to have a rational process for making a decision which involves open discussion amongst senior policy makers.
Chapter 4 Contending definitions
This chapter discusses how two leading theories of International Relations describe rationality in the decision making process. The two theories discussed are rational choice theory and political psychology.
Both rational choice theory and political psychology use the theory of utility maximisation. That is the system where you multiply the possibility of a consequence by the value of it to you and then compare it with other variants. (For example; I value my life a great deal, but the probability of being killed when I cross the road is very low, so I still cross the road). Rational choice theorists say that leaders make decisions as if they were using utility maximisation, without actually committing to saying that they do. Mearsheimer argues that rational choice theorists have to abandon their “as if” if they are to describe what really happens. But, when they do this, they are proposing that policy makers use a method which is inherently irrational. Political psychologists argue that leaders are often distracted from following utility maximisation theory by “bias”; being led astray by irrational thinking. Both schools have little to say about how policy makers collectively make decisions. The lack of data in international affairs means that utility maximisation would actually be an irrational way of making decisions.
In place of utility maximisation, which Mearsheimer says is not how leaders actually make decisions:
The best, though by no means perfect, way to estimate likelihoods in international politics is by employing credible theories: logically consistent, empirically verified, probabilistic statements about the way the world works.
Mearsheimer discusses the theory of political psychology. This theory says that most decision making in International Relations is non-rational. Actors rely on heuristics, non-rational oversimplification strategies, and simply lack computational power to make rational decisions. They frequently deviate from rationality. Rationality is, again, taken to be utility maximisation:
Individuals who employ analogies or heuristics are nonrational or biased, which is to say their decisions deviate from what expected utility maximization prescribes. “Biases,” Tversky and Kahneman write, “stem from the reliance on judgmental heuristics,” which are “highly economical and usually effective” but can also “lead to systematic and predictable errors.” Janice Gross Stein makes a similar point, noting that individuals who reason by analogy “unconsciously strip the nuance, the context, the subtleties out of the problems they face” and can reach “very oversimplified judgments.”
Mearsheimer rejects political psychology. He believes that actors in international relationships typically do make rational decisions. They do so by basing their thinking on credible theories, liberal internationalism or realism, for example. The second part of coming to a rational decision is for there to be a meaningful process of discussion among decision makers. He believes that this happens in most cases. He argues that political psychologists have no “story” about how collective decisions are made. In this book, published in 2023, Mearsheimer does not address the current decision making in the West as concerns Ukraine. This reviewer can’t help wondering if this would not be one of the exceptions that Measheimer allows. Certainly; we can see abundant examples of heuristics, such as not being willing to update an initial view when more information becomes available, as well as arguments from analogies, for example comparisons between the appeasement of Hitler at Munich and “appeasing” Putin today.
Chapter 5 Rationality and Grand Strategy
Mearsheimer argues that states work out foreign policy rationally, based on a credible theory and by having a rational debate amongst policy makers, with the final decision reached by consensus or if not by the ultimate decision-maker. In this chapter he gives examples from history to back up his view, choosing cases which are sometimes cited as evidence of irrationality, such as Japanese policy before WWII, and French policy also before WWII.
In one example, Mearsheimer discusses US policy after the end of the Cold War. He argues that it was based on credible, (but wrong in his view), liberal theories; democratic peace theory, institutional internationalism and economic interdependence. The policy was debated, thus meeting his second criteria of rational state decision making. The question of NATO enlargement versus PfP (Partnership for Peace) was also discussed with Clinton finally opting for enlargement, believing he could convince the Russians that the plan was benign. This was an example of rational decision making.
Mearsheimer argues that rationality is not about outcomes, but about process. A bad outcome does not mean that the decision making was irrational. A rational decision making process can lead to a bad outcome.
Chapter 6 Rationality and Crisis Management
In this chapter Mearsheimer discusses whether states think rationally during crises. He finds that leaders think rationally during crisis management periods just as they do when making long-term policy. He supports his argument with historical case studies, including the Cuban missile crisis, US decisions to escalate in Korea and Vietnam, Japanese decision-making in Pearl Harbour, Hitler and Operation Barbarossa and the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia. In each case discussion proceeds based on credible theories and involves an open and deliberative process. Once again, Mearsheimer says that he has deliberately selected case studies which are often held up as examples of irrationality in order to strengthen his argument.
Interestingly, Mearsheimer says that the empirical historical material suggests that leaders are relatively insulated from domestic pressures:
In addition, they demonstrate that the decision-making process is largely unaffected by the nature of political institutions, the influence of powerful domestic interest groups, the need to respond to public opinion, or interference by military leaders. Instead, the key policymakers are typically insulated from domestic pressures, and although particular military leaders are consulted, their opinions do not loom large in the final decision.
Chapter 7 Nonrational State Behaviour
In this chapter Mearsheimer gives examples of what he thinks have been instances of irrational state behaviour. The examples show irrationality either in theory or in the deliberative process. However; if there is irrationality in one field there is usually irrationality in the other.
The examples he gives are: the Bay of Pigs, the US decision to invade Iraq 2003, Germany building up a naval fleet 1900 and Britain not building up a land army to fight in Europe in 1930s.
In the case of Germany not building up a naval fleet the irrationality lay in the use of risk theory rather than “the well-established balance of power theory”. The theory was that Britain would be deterred by a sizable German fleet even if that fleet was not big enough to defeat Britain, because Britain would understand that were they to fight the Germans they would be weakened and would thus be at the mercy of France and Russia. However, Britain responded following balance of power theory and simply balanced against the German fleet, thus undermining the German plan. This case was also irrational because it was the work of one admiral and there was no deliberative process.
In the case of Britain not building up a land army to fight in the 1930s Chamberlain as Prime Minister adopted a policy of no liability. He abandoned Britain’s usual balancing. This was based on emotional thinking about the horrors of war. By the time of the Munich crisis he was thinking rationally about balancing, but now he had no army to negotiate with.
The Bay of Pigs operation, when the US tried to invade Cuba in 1961, was based on non credible military theories, for example the potential of a small invading force to overcome a greater defending force, and the CIA was allowed to go ahead without criticism.
The US invasion of Iraq relied on democratic peace theory and forcible democracy theory. The former is a credible, but incorrect, in Mearsheimer’s view, theory. The latter is a non-rational theory, as we have seen above, (Chapter 3). This theory holds that tyrants are the principal obstacles to the public yearning for democracy. In real time we saw empirical evidence of the irrationality of this theory as, instead of rising up and welcoming the US troops, large sections of Iraqi society, Sunnis and Shias alike resisted the invading forces.
Mearsheimer shows the attachment to this irrational theory amongst US policy makers:
Defense Paul Wolfowitz laid out the logic in an interview with the Detroit News: “Our principal goal is the psychological one, to convince the Iraqi people that they no longer have to be afraid of Saddam . . . and once that happens I think what you’re going to find, and this is very important, you’re going to find Iraqis out cheering American troops.”
and
“We’ll overthrow this brutal dictator. We’ll create this provisional government of exiles. They’ll be welcomed, and we’ll leave them to their economic prosperity and representative government. All these other awful regimes in the region will fall like dominoes. The whole place becomes better for Israel. Beautiful picture!” [A subordinate of Secretary of State Powell]
In planning for the Iraq invasion, there was no deliberative process. There was no plan for after the war, just some assumption everything would fall into place. Attempts to raise questions about post war plans especially by the military were ignored by the civilian leadership.
Mearsheimer suggests that a key factor in non-rational state decision making is if the leader does not facilitate discussion.
Chapter 8 Goal Rationality
Mearsheimer disputes the idea that there is no such thing as goal rationality, that rationality is only about how goals are achieved and the choice of goal is arbitrary. For Mearsheimer, the empirical record shows that states do think rationally about goals; and the ubiquitous conclusion is that survival is the most important goal. Mearshimer argues that because all other goals, such as prosperity or even the ability to spread one’s ideology depend on survival, survival is the most important goal.
Mearsheimer cites scholar James Fearon who argues states may prioritise prosperity. Mearsheimer disagrees:
Fearon’s mistake is to equate states and neoclassical firms when they are in fact fundamentally different entities. Unlike business firms, which exist to make money for their owners, political entities exist in order to exist. Amalgamation into a new entity, which can be an attractive option for a firm, is thus off the table for states.
This is a flaw in Mearsheimer’s theory. If we, following his example, look at the empirical record, we can see how the UK, to take one example, has prioritised prosperity, at least of the elite classes, over survival of the state. Since the 1980s, the UK has adopted an economic policy of absolute privatisation. This policy is maintained regardless of which political party is in power. All strategic national monopolies including even the national electrical distribution grid, electricity generation, and communications are now in private hands. The owners are often US or Chinese or European or Middle Eastern equity companies. In allowing this the UK has given up political control over its destiny. Indeed the UK hardly exists as a coherent political entity any more. The fact is that the UK political class treats the state just like a business firm which exists to make money. They have been so busy making money that, (by Mearsheimer’s own testimony in recent media appearances), the military has been allowed to atrophy. Apparently; one reason why it is hard to ramp up arms production in Europe to “support” Ukraine is that privatised arms companies won’t budge without long-term commercial contracts. They can’t just be ordered to ramp up production, as can nationalised arms industries. The UK political elite have sold the country and its security to international speculators. They have chosen prosperity, for themselves and their global corporate-financial allies over the survival of the state as the highest goal. Mearsheimer says:
States aim to preserve the integrity of their physical base and maintain their ability to determine their own political fate. A state’s physical base includes its territory, its population, and the resources within its borders.
But, the empirical evidence is that the UK political elite have abandoned this aim. The UK government does not have control over the resources within its borders. For example; at the time of writing, despite the disastrous record of privatised water companies, the consensus is that the government cannot renationalise them, because it would simply be too expensive. As well as ignoring a large chunk of empirical evidence, Mearsheimer’s causal logic is also at fault:
There is only one inviolable rule. Survival is primary, and all other objectives must be subordinated to it. It is a matter of incontrovertible logic and evidence that a state cannot achieve any other goal if it does not first survive as a state.
However; even if the British state were to be completely taken over by the US, legally and in terms of jurisdiction, the elite would still have succeeded in their aim, of personal profit. Mearsheimer’s argument about state survival is largely credible, and obviously so, (survival is a condition for other aims), but misses this particular case of elite abandonment of the state in pursuit of their own interests in a global context.
Even if Mearsheimer allowed such conduct he would describe it as “non-rational”;
It follows that actors who do not want to survive, or who rank survival below other goals, are nonrational.
However; from their own point of view the British elites who put themselves at the service of global financial interests in the hope of personal reward are acting rationally. We agree with James Fearon, as represented by Mearsheimer:
He [James Fearon] argues that prosperity may be more important than survival for states, in which case they might surrender sovereignty—be willing to die—so as to maximize their prosperity.
Mearsheimer’s error is he does not allow that elites who control a state can betray that state in their own interests. But this is a real possibility and the empirical evidence is that this is what has happened in the United Kingdom.
The above argument concerns only one small part of Mearsheimer’s overall theory. Following Mearsheimer, we agree that a theory can remain credible even if it has relatively minor flaws, such as this one. This flaw in his theory does not affect his theory as a whole.
(Just after writing this review, I came across this article in the Guardian. It is a review of a book called Vassal State: How America Runs Britain, by Angus Hanton. Based on the review, the book is about precisely how the UK state has lost control to American corporations and is subject to US government pressure in defence of those interests. The material in this article makes a very strong empirical case for why Mearsheimer is wrong). [2]
As an example of a state prioritising survival over prosperity. Mearsheimer cites the possibility of China invading Taiwan. Were they to do this it would be economically destructive for them, but it would be driven by the rational aim of survival of the Chinese state. We do not disagree with Mearsheimer’s argument as being applicable in most cases. We accept that the most rational goal for a state is survival of the state and that states generally follow this goal. Our case, above, about the United Kingdom, (and possibly other European states), is an exception. From the point of view of the state, the behaviour of UK political elites is non-rational (prosperity is chosen as a goal over survival). But, from their own point of view, as a class or group, the policy is rational. Mearsheimer’s theory assumes, wrongly, that political elites do not, at times, separate their own interests from those of the state, and pursue the latter.
For Mearsheimer the only example of goal irrationality is Germany continuing to fight after defeat was inevitable in WWII. This led to the complete destruction of Germany.
Chapter 9 Rationality in International Politics
Mearsheimer’s theory is a structural theory. States act, for the most part, rationally. Because of the structure of the international system, states acting rationally, (that is prioritising their survival which means striving for hegemony), can lead to war.
The reason it matters to maintain that states are rational actors is that the major theories of International Relations, liberal theories and realism, rely on this assumption. If rational choice theory and political psychology, (Chapter 4), are correct and states are routinely irrational, the theories of liberal theories and realism are no longer viable. How would states then formulate policy or responses to crises?
As Mearsheimer notes, his theories explain how easily even democratic states which supposedly value human rights, can act barbarically – for example deliberately bombing civilians. His theory is about survival and morality takes a second place. It is not, as he concedes, an “uplifting” vision. And this is why his other book on this subject is called The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. [3]
Mearsheimer, John J.; Rosato, Sebastian. How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy (p. 94). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.
Notes
2. Vassal State: How America Runs Britain, by Angus Hanton. Swift Press 2024
3. https://thenewobserver.co.uk/the-tragedy-of-great-power-politics-professor-john-mearsheimer/