It looks like the Trump administrations model for ending the Ukraine war is a standard model of ceasefire leading to talks. In general terms, this is not an unreasonable approach. I’ve seen experts on conflict resolution suggest that this is a reliable model to end a war. There are small steps, such as prisoner exchanges and these, gradually, lead to bigger steps, a ceasefire and then discussions, negotiations, trading of positions, and an agreement.
The problem in this case is that Russia does not really have a bargaining position. They have a very clear set of demands. The demands are essentially non-negotiable. (There could, for example, be some negotiation around what exactly it means for Ukraine to demilitarise, but the basic demand is not negotiable. This website has suggested before that it is conceivable that there could be some flexibility around the exact constitutional status of Kherson and Zaporizhia provinces, but that may be wishful thinking. In general, there is very little room for manoeuvre). All those who think they can achieve peace by exerting more pressure on Russia, military, or economic, and thus force concessions, are simply missing the point. They are not paying attention. These ideas do not take account of the actual Russian position, and thus, are bound to fail. Putin’s demands are not a negotiable wish list which he will amend if they are linked to higher costs; they are, from Russia’s point of view, key, strategic, non-negotiable demands. The misconception that you can trade with Russia’s demands abounds in Europe, but I think that the Trump administration is also affected.
From the Russian point of view, there is nothing to be gained from a “confidence building ceasefire”; they simply need their demands to be met. If a ceasefire was a 100% guaranteed prelude to all their demands being met one imagines that they would probably say yes. But, very clearly, it isn’t. The statements coming out of Europe and Kiev indicate, at least, that they see a ceasefire as an opportunity to “strengthen” Ukraine. The diametric opposite of the Russian demands. Russia has issued a set of demands and we are still in the phase where we are waiting for everyone else to realise that there are no meaningful alternatives.
It is no surprise therefore to hear that the Russian side have officially announced that the ceasefire plan is not going to work. [1]
The Guardian’s Pjotr Sauer says of Russia’s demands, (no NATO in Ukraine, a demilitarised Ukraine, and possession of Crimea plus the 4 contested provinces), that “Moscow’s terms would, in effect, dismantle Ukraine as an independent, functioning state – pulling it firmly into Russia’s sphere of influence.” But, this is not true. Yes; Ukraine would lose 20% of its former territory. But, a good part of that territory contains inhabitants who would actually prefer to live in Russia. Talking about Donbas, if Kiev is not prepared to grant them autonomy within a pluralist Ukrainian state, then the only other outcome is annexation by Russia. And, how could Kiev rule Crimea; a majority ethnic Russian population, and a clear desire to be part of Russia? The option was there for Kiev to govern in a pluralist way, permitting different expressions of Ukrainian identity. But, following Maidan, the regime in Kiev became extremely focussed on Ukrainian nationalism, and the country being split is more or less the inevitable result of that. * Nothing in this though, prevents, the remaining 80% of Ukraine from continuing to follow their cultural-historical project of Ukrainian nationalism. Nothing prevents them joining the EU. (In theory; though the ever increasing militarisation of the EU especially under von der Leyen does in fact create risks for this project). And while, no state chooses to be neutered, one imagines, there are models of neutral states – such as Austria, and Finland before 2022, which can thrive and prosper. Georgia could too. Contrary to Western propaganda Putin almost certainly does not want to rule parts of Ukraine beyond the East, where Russia forces would encounter Western Ukrainians with a very different ethos to those in Eastern Ukraine. His recent suggestion that this part of Ukraine be temporarily governed by a UN mandate is, in reality, an attempt to create a functioning state on his borders. A neutral Ukraine based on current Ukraine minus 4 provinces would be neither fully in Russia’s sphere of influence nor fully in the EU-NATO sphere of influence, though, through membership of the EU they would be substantially part of Western Europe.
One final point. While the Trump administration is continuing to feed weapons to Kiev, this is the last few billion left from the last big tranche agreed by Congress in April 2024. It seems hard to imagine that Congress will stump up another USD 60 billion. There are some additional gifts being proposed by France, Germany and the UK, and some other small contributions from other Europe states, but it is not clear that this is going to be enough to replace the US contribution. (Commentators I listen to suggest that the EU cannot replace the US). This means that in the next few months Kiev is very likely to have an arms crisis, to add to their manpower crisis. The pressure is going to be mounting, not on Russia, but on Kiev, to make concessions. Trump would do well to back out now cleanly before they have to execute (another) humiliating retreat. He is not going to get his moment in the Sun when he joins Zelensky’s and Putin’s hands and gets a Nobel prize. If he understands that then there is hope. But this requires a very different approach from the US.
The only apparent card Trump has to play is secondary sanctions on Russian oil exports. In his threat he did not specify if he intends country sanctions or economic enterprise sanctions. It is hard to see how he could bring in another 25% tariff on China without wreaking havoc with the US economy. US trade with India seems to be quite significant [2]; again a high tariff on all goods from India would have significant costs for the US too. If the sanctions are targeted on individual importers and refiners then they might have some effect, but relatively limited. We have plenty of examples of how this kind of sanctions regime is a game of whack-a-mole. Figures from Russia suggest that the share of oil and gas as a contribution to the state budget is much lower than what is was and is now 27%. [3] I am not an economist and do not have the time and resources to calculate the possible impact of secondary sanctions on oil exports on the Russian budget and economy. No doubt it would be substantial. But my guess is, survivable. And, at any event, it doesn’t matter. As per the above Russia sees their demands as existential. If they have to suffer more then they will suffer more. (One error European leaders may be making is thinking that Putin is like themselves; at the first sign of substantial discomfort they would give in. Indeed European leaders are not even willing to let their populations go a couple of degrees colder and are still importing substantial amounts of Russian gas to keep them warm. All those Ukrainian flags they love wrapping themselves in obviously do not have very good insulating properties). [4] The mood in Russia is somewhat grim at the moment. I think this is because with the sheer numbers of people dying, many people are being touched by the realities of war. I’m told that most people know someone who has died, a friend or a relative. At the same time I’m not sure I see much desire for capitulation. This view is confirmed by social media research, published in the New York Times. [5] If Trump plays his last trump card and loses it would be another big humiliation for the United States.
Update from Europe 2/4/25
This is the Kaja Kallas, the ludicrous High Representative for Foreign Affairs accusing Russia of: “playing games and not really wanting peace”. I think she has been repeating this theme for some time now. It is a Zelensky line. (It looks like European leaders are still taking briefings from the Kiev regime). Is it necessary to point out the absurdity of it, the pure no-thought? It seems so; at least for the benefit of the Western media who, these days, do nothing but echo this insanity. Just because the US, (an active belligerent and party to the war), has tried to initiate a ceasefire it does not follow that everyone will immediately fall into line. The way that ceasefires work is they have to be based on offering both sides some possibility of obtaining at least some advantage from the ceasefire. As we explain above, because Russia’s demands are already a set of minimum demands that in essence means agreeing to all their demands before a ceasefire can take place; which is indeed the position as outlined by Putin back in, I think, June last year. If the ceasefire offer on the table does not get close enough to Russia’s demands they will not bite. (There are some specifics in this case but there is also a general point; just because a ceasefire plan is presented in any conflict it does not follow that any or all sides are going to accept it). Russia isn’t “playing games”. They just calculate that the ceasefire offered is not to their advantage. Only in Kallas’ demented imagination should Russia jump straight through the first hoop presented to them just because it has been presented to them. Once again we see that they view Russia as a naughty child who must do what they tell it. These people, Starmer, Macron, Kallas, Costa are now at a point where they are making a highly embarrassing display of the utter absence of any serious statecraft at a European level. Really not just an absence of statecraft, but an abundance of ignorance and an overwhelming tendency to delusional no-thinking.
* This is essentially the argument of Professor Richard Sakwa’s excellent book, Frontline Ukraine Crisis in the Borderlands.
Notes
- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/01/russia-cannot-accept-us-peace-plan-ukraine-current-form
- https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/south-central-asia/india
- https://tass.com/economy/1850007
- https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/27/europe-imports-more-russian-gas-aiding-wartime-economy-report-finds
- https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/20/world/europe/russia-attitude-war-ukraine.html