As expected “But in Nato policy circles, there was a sense that Putin’s comments should not be taken at face value” – according to the Guardian. The comments that should not be taken at face value are the comments when Putin indicates that if the West allows Kiev to use long-range missiles to attack the Russian homeland Russia will consider itself to be at war with NATO, and the conflict will be on a wholly new plane. Apparently, a US spokesperson even called Putin’s comments “a funny bit of Putin propaganda“.
However; exactly the opposite is true – and obviously true. The Storm Shadows and ATACMS use NATO satellite systems for guidance. Putin also claims that the missiles can only be programmed by Western technicians. I don’t know if that is true or not, but what matters is that Putin thinks it is the case. So; indeed Russia can hardly avoid seeing itself at war with the West if this goes ahead.
One point, and I am thinking here in terms of escalation in general, not necessarily in response to any specific changes in connection with missile permissions. It seems to me that if Russia decides to engage the West they are more likely to use hybrid warfare than use a nuclear weapon. There is a great deal that Russia could do to hurt Western nations by blowing up communications and/or energy infrastructure in international waters. Such actions would be painful. They could have significant economic consequences. They would “bring the war home” to European and US populations. And, they would pose a conundrum for Western leaders as to how to react. They would not be able to reciprocate in kind, because Russia is a single land-mass and its connections go across land borders. Would the West be willing to start blowing up e.g. oil pipelines to China which pass through third-countries in those third party countries, e.g. Kazakhstan? Would China not object? So, what would they do? This would be the kind of sideways, hybrid action that appeals to Russia. (Let’s hope I’m right and they don’t in fact decide to do a demonstration with a nuclear missile).
Finally; there is no sense that this move, if indeed it takes place, to allow Kiev to use Western supplied missiles to strike 200 miles inside Russia’s internationally recognised border, is any more strategically intelligent than anything which has gone before. As the US Défense Secretary himself has pointed out; Russia has already moved the take-off points for its bombers back to 200 miles from the front-line. What is Kiev going to be able to hit with a limited amount of missiles with a 200 mile range which could make a significant strategic difference? And, worse for Ukraine, many of them will be shot down by Russia’s air defences before they reach their targets. At best, like all the other Western limits which have had to be overturned as Kiev started losing, (“adapting to changing conditions”), this will simply keep Ukraine in the fight a little longer. As Mearsheimer points out; the hope is that the actual impact of these rockets would be very limited and Russia would not feel they needed to react.
NATO, amazingly, seems to have no strategic plan, beyond, “let’s cause Russia some costs and maybe they will back off enough for us and Kiev to claim some kind of a victory”. But if there was any doubt at a theoretical level that Russia sees this as existential and so, is not going to back down because of some costs, the evidence of the last two years should show that Russia is ready to absorb very considerable costs in pursuit of their clearly stated aims. Furthermore; this “policy” has a paradoxical catch. The more Ukraine is permitted to strike inside the Russian homeland, the easier it becomes for the Kremlin to present this, to the Russian people, as a direct attack on Russia by the West, and, the result is that the war will become more popular in Russia, not less.
I think John Mearsheimer is probably right. Zelensky knows that this is not a “game-changer”. The whole idea from Kiev’s point of view is to provoke Russia into striking the West, leading to the West becoming involved in the war. It looks like Biden and Starmer are performing some kind of strange tight-rope balancing act; how to prolong the war a bit longer, keep the narrative about Ukraine’s inevitable victory alive a bit longer, but at the same time, not “escalate” with Russia. Western support for Ukraine has had this impossible to solve dilemma embedded in its core from the very start; how can the West support Ukraine to win, while not “escalating” with Russia? It looks like the range of options to maintain this balance is becoming very narrow, and some rather strange pirouetting is now required. With this pirouetting, the risk of “miscalculation” becomes even greater. They, the West, could take a bold move and, (as some vocal war mongers in commenting and political circles urge), just escalate without any caution. That would lead to WWIII. But, a second alternative exists; while trying to avoid this escalatory path but also trying to keep Ukraine in the game, they will, accidentally cross the line that, in effect, leads to WWIII. It looks like we may be now entering this territory.